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Abstract the Framework Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupa­
tion of 2000 introduces the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to peo­
ple with disabilities. the author deals with the impact and meaning of this obligation 
from a human rights perspective. Adopting a substantive approach to equality, it has 
been recognised that States Parties have positive obligations to bring about equality, 
which may entail that duties are imposed on third parties. Although thus far there is 
little case law of the european court of Justice on the implications of the Framework 
Directive, the judgments of other international bodies on human rights law provide 
relevant points for interpretation. 
Keywords Discrimination · disability · reasonable accommodation · human rights 
law
1. Introduction
the eU Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ­
ment and occupation of 2000 (hereafter: the Framework Directive) contains in Arti­
cle 5 a provision, which obliges employers to take appropriate measures to enable 
)
  Directive 2000 /78 /ec; OJ l 303, 2. 2. 2000, p. 6. 
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a person with disabilities to participate in employment or training, unless such meas­
ures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.
this explicit obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation is seen as a new 
element in the anti­discrimination law of the eU. in this contribution it will be ana­
lysed whether it is really a unique provision, how it is related to the principle of 
equality, to other international legal instruments and what the possible implications 
are. Finally some attention will be paid to relevant case law of the european court 
and some national institutions.
2. Substantive equality and positive obligations
2. Positive human rights obligations and substantive equality
Generally speaking ‘equality’ can be conceived in a formal and in a more substan­
tive way. the formal approach of equality reflects the first part of Aristoteles’ defini­
tion, that equal cases should be treated equally, the substantive approach refers to 
the second part that different cases have to be treated differently in proportion to the 
difference.2
While a formal approach emphasises the irrelevance of differences and the impor­
tance of equal treatment, the second approach acknowledges the possible relevance 
of differences and aims at promoting equality and focuses on the realisation of equal 
results.
the two approaches can be in tension with each other. it may also depend on the 
circumstances of the case, whether a formal or a substantive approach is to be chosen. 
in most equal pay cases, for example, it can be held that it is not relevant whether an 
employee is of either sex, has a disability or not, when the work done by a disabled 
employee is the same work as done by others.
A complication of the formal approach is that it still has to be determined whether 
two cases are equal: equality depends also on the perspective of the actor. When i am 
only looking for a place to sit ‘any chair is a chair’, but when i want to buy a chair that 
can be combined with my table, differences in height, colour and size are relevant. 
And when it comes to the question whether the colour is compatible with the colour 
of the table, the answer to this question may vary according to fashion or culture and 
these preferences may change in the course of time.
So, even in a formal equality approach it seems inevitable that the way a ‘differ­
ence’ is justified is coloured by personal circumstances of the observer. 
A substantive approach is important to make underlying preferences more explicit: 
when equal treatment brings about (increase of) inequality, it has to be questioned 
whether differences oblige a difference in treatment. this compels us to challenge the 
neutrality of regular dominant views.
Substantive equality not only demands abstention from discrimination, but implies 
an obligation to take differences into account and to take positive measures to bring 
about equality. 
2)
  See also: Waddington /Hendriks [9], par. 2..
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this ‘obligations approach’ has been developed in the implementation of human 
rights instruments.3 in first instance it might have been assumed that civil and po­
litical rights contain mostly negative obligations, forbidding the state authorities to 
interfere with individual freedoms, such as freedom of expression or privacy, and 
that social and economic rights entail positive obligations to promote, ensure and 
fulfil these rights, such as the right to work, or to housing. Such a rigid dichotomy 
is not followed any longer in the interpretation of human rights law by national and 
international courts and other bodies. in the General recommendations of the UN 
treaty bodies and the case law of the european court of Human rights and other 
supervisory bodies, it has been established that all human rights entail both positive 
and negative obligations. 
this is seen as a consequence of the acceptance of the indivisibility and interde­
pendence of human rights, which has been reaffirmed at the declaration adopted at 
the Vienna World conference on Human rights in 993.4
the types of obligations are generally described as the obligations to respect, pro­
tect and fulfil, the first being a negative obligation and the two latter positive.5
Applied to the principle of equality, positive obligations entail that states may 
have to take measures to bring about, or at least promote, equality and this obligation 
includes measures that bind third parties.6 the measures to be taken may also have 
financial consequences. 
the european court of Human rights already established firmly in 979 that the 
european convention entails positive obligations. in the Airey case the court held 
that the right to access to court of Article 6 of the ecHr means that under certain 
circumstances free legal aid should be made available. the court rejected the irish 
Government’s view that, as there was no obstacle for the plaintiff’s right to access to 
court, there could not be a contravention of the right to access. the court emphasises 
that the right to access must be an effective right, and thus investigates in this par­
ticular case whether there can be an effective right without free legal aid. the court 
states that 
“… fulfilment of a duty under the convention on occasion necessitates some 
positive action on the part of the State; in such circumstances, the State cannot 
simply remain passive” and “there is … no room to distinguish between acts 
and omissions”.7 
in this case the court explicitly rejects the idea that several categories of human rights 
imply different kinds of obligations:
“the mere fact that an interpretation of the convention may extend into the 
sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against 
3)
  See a.o., Sepúlveda [7]. 
4)
  A /cONF.57 /23, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.
5)
  Nowak [5], par. 3.2..
6)
  Arnadóttir [], par. 5..3
7)




such an interpretation; there is no water­tight division separating that sphere 
from the field covered by the convention”.8
in the Marckx case, dealing with the question of whether the difference made under 
Belgian law between ‘illegitimate’ and legitimate children constitutes a violation of 
their right to family life, the court held that this difference in treatment was not 
only a violation of Article 8 of the ecHr (right to family life) but also of Article 4 
(providing a subsidiary prohibition of discrimination), thereby referring to positive 
obligations of the State: 
“it does not exclude that a judgment finding a breach of the convention on one 
of those aspects might render desirable or necessary a reform of the law on other 
matters not submitted for examination in the present proceedings. it is for the 
respondent State, and the respondent State alone, to take the measures it consid­
ers appropriate to ensure that its domestic law is coherent and consistent.”9
in the interpretation of Article 4 ecHr the court has developed an approach in its 
case law that the prohibition of discrimination prohibits not only a difference in treat­
ment of persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasona­
ble justification,0 but that there is also a violation of the non­discrimination provision 
when States fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly differ­
ent without an objective and reasonable justification, as was the case in Thlimmenos 
vs. Greece. the Greek government in this case refused to appoint Mr. thlimmenos 
to a post of chartered accountant on account of his criminal conviction for disobey­
ing, because of his religious beliefs, the order to wear the military uniform, which 
was a consequence of his conviction as a Jehovah’s Witness. 
the Marckx and Thlimmenos cases illustrate that a substantive equality approach 
is closely linked with the broader aim to guarantee universal human rights to all. 
the right to work or the right to family life or education often cannot be effectively 
guaranteed to people with disabilities when the conditions are not adapted to their 
specific needs.
the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations is in line with this. there­
fore, it is most relevant to take the broader human rights context into account in the 
definition of the scope and meaning of this concept.
2.2 Obligations related to non­discrimination
the Thlimmenos case is one of the examples of the ecHr case law’s application of 
obligations imposed on the states to guarantee substantive equality. the case law of 
the european court of Justice on the earlier directives goes also in the direction of 
guaranteeing substantive equality. in a case on Directive 76 /207 /eec on equal treat­
ment of Men and Women, the court clearly stated that: 
8)
  ibid., par. 26.
9)
  ecHr, 3 June 979, Marckx vs. Belgium, par. 4.
0)
  See van Dijk /van Hoof /van Rijn /Zwaak [8], ch. 33, at p. 042.
)
  ecHr, 6 April 2000, Thlimmenos vs. Greece, par.44
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“the conferral of such rights, recognised by the Directive, is intended to en­
sure implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women 
regarding both access to employment (Article 3()) and working conditions 
(Article 5()). therefore, the exercise of the rights conferred on women under 
Article 2(3) cannot be the subject of unfavourable treatment regarding their ac­
cess to employment or their working conditions. in that light, the result pursued 
by the Directive is substantive, not formal, equality.”2
in its first ruling on the Framework Directive, the Mangold case on age discrimina­
tion,3 the european court of Justice has repeated the fundamental character of the 
principle of non­discrimination, referring to international instruments and the consti­
tutional traditions common to the Member States. the Directive merely lays down 
the framework for specific grounds in a specific area.
the reference to (other) international instruments is also made in the case of K.B. 
vs. National Health Service Pensions Agency, Secretary of State for Health.4 in this 
case on survivors’ pensions for partners of transsexuals, the court based its conclu­
sion that there was a contravention of Article 4 ec on the fact that the ecHr had 
already established that the underlying law violated the ecHr, as can be read in the 
following paragraphs: 
‘34. Legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, in 
breach of the ECHR, prevents a couple such as K.B. and R. from fulfilling 
the marriage requirement which must be met for one of them to be able 
to benefit from part of the pay of the other must be regarded as being, in 
principle, incompatible with the requirements of Article 141 EC. 
35. Since it is for the Member States to determine the conditions under which 
legal recognition is given to the change of gender of a person in r.’s situation – 
as the european court of Human rights has accepted (Goodwin vs. United 
Kingdom, § 03) – it is for the national court to determine whether in a case 
such as that in the main proceedings a person in K.B.’s situation can rely on 
Article 4 ec in order to gain recognition of her right to nominate her partner 
as the beneficiary of a survivor’s pension. 
36. It follows from the foregoing that Article 141 EC, in principle, pre-
cludes legislation, such as that at issue before the national court, which, in 
breach of the ECHR, prevents a couple such as K.B. and R. from fulfilling 
the marriage requirement which must be met for one of them to be able 
to benefit from part of the pay of the other. It is for the national court to 
determine whether in a case such as that in the main proceedings a person 
in K.B.’s situation can rely on Article 141 EC in order to gain recogni-
tion of her right to nominate her partner as the beneficiary of a survivor’s 
 pension.’ 
2)
  case c­36 /95 Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salariés (CNAVTS) vs. Thibault 
[998] ecr i­20, par.26.
3)
  case c­44 /04 Mangold [2005] i­998, par. 74.
4)




The principle of non-discrimination as incorporated in Community Law is thus 
seen as Community implementation of the fundamental principle of equality, 
which includes the obligation to bring relevant national legislation in conformity 
with international human rights law. 
this is also valid before the period prescribed for transposition of a Directive, as 
the court ruled in the abovementioned Mangold case. 
looking into national law, the Dutch equal treatment commission’ Opinions on 
other grounds than disability provide several examples of concrete obligations im­
posed on employers to accommodate to equal treatment, such as the obligation to 
have separate hygiene facilities for both men and women (Opinion 996­2 and 
2006­6).
Summarising, we can say that the obligation to provide a reasonable accommoda­
tion is, as such, not revolutionary, but very much in line with two interrelated doc­
trines of substantive equality and positive obligations.
this is important because the national courts are required to apply the national 
law in conformity with international obligations, which means that the international 
standards provide the framework for interpretation of the national law, and the same 
holds, as we have seen, for the european court of Justice. the relevant international 
law and its interpretation by the competent institutions such as treaty bodies and the 
ectHr play a role in the development of the concept of reasonable accommodation of 
the Framework Directive. As Mark Bell states ‘it is not enough for eU states to rely 
only on eU Directives as solely response to discrimination.’5 
therefore, it is relevant to consider the contents of the cases of the ectHr in this 
field and pay attention to the UN convention on the rights of Persons with Disabili­
ties, recently adopted by the United Nations.6 even though this convention is still 
to enter into force (see Article 45: 20 ratifications are required), it can be seen as an 
important framework for reference. 
3 Positive obligations and Disability
3. the Disability convention
the convention on the rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted on 3 December 
2006, together with the optional protocol, which opens the possibility for individual 
complaints, provides a very interesting framework. it is not only important because 
of the extensive elaboration of the rights of people with disabilities, but also, and 
perhaps even more, because it makes very clear what are the essential aspects of dis­
ability discrimination, and because it can be seen as a firm step towards a rights­based 
approach to disability, as endorsed by the european Union.7 As can be read in the 
communication of the commission the rights­based approach is based on the equal­
5)
  Bell [2], at p. 70.
6)
  the text is available at http://www.un.org /disabilities /convention /conventionfull.shtml.
7)
  See the communication to the council and the european Parliament: towards a United Nations legally 
binding instrument to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, cOM (2003) 
6 final.
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ity principle. Disability rights are no longer placed in a medical care model, but in the 
perspective of full participation.8 
This is very clearly formulated in paragraph c(bis) of the Preamble: ‘Recog-
nising that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the 
interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmen-
tal barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others’. 
Disability discrimination is caused by both individual discrimination of people 
with impairments and by the fact that they are faced with structural barriers that 
prevent their participation: when all people use sign language, as was the case during 
a period from the 7th to early 20th century in the community of Martha’s Vineyard, 
where a substantial percentage of the inhabitants was deaf, deaf people cannot be 
distinguished from others.9 in the same way, people with bad sight are not disabled 
when glasses can give adequate compensation.
Article 1 of the Convention (from which article no reservations are allowed) 
establishes the Purpose of the Convention in the same line: 
‘the purpose of the present convention is to promote, protect and ensure the 
full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all 
persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.
Persons with disabilities include those who have long­term physical, mental, 
intellectual, or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers 
may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis 
with others.’
the definitions provision in Article 2 of the convention includes the obligation of 
providing a reasonable accommodation in the concept of discrimination on the ba­
sis of disability and defines reasonable accommodation as ‘necessary and appropri­
ate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, 
where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoy­
ment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’.
this seems to be very much in line with the provisions of the Framework Direc­
tive.
Article 27 of the convention provides an elaborate provision on the right of per­
sons with disabilities to work and employment, repeating the obligation of the States 
Parties to ensure that reasonable accommodations are provided (under (i)). the fact 
that the States must ensure this, means that it is a very strict obligation. 
Also relevant is that the text of Article 27 makes clear that a reasonable accommo­
dation is not a form of affirmative action: this is mentioned under (h) of Article 27, 
which imposes on States Parties the obligation to ‘Promote the employment of per­
sons with disabilities in the private sector through appropriate policies and measures, 
which may include affirmative action programmes, incentives and other measures’.
8)
  On the concepts of disability see also: Pooran /Wilkie [6], at pp. 2, 3.
9)




it is not possible here to go deeper into the concept of affirmative action but is 
must be emphasised that Article 27 of the convention reaffirms that a reasonable ac­
commodation is not the same as a temporary special measure like affirmative action. 
Distinct from affirmative action, reasonable accommodations constitute no tempo­
rarily allowed exceptions to the rule of equal treatment, but are part of the general 
obligation of non­discrimination and equal treatment. the same distinction is made 
in the Framework Directive in Articles 5 and 7.
3.2 ecHr and eSc cases
the european court of Human rights has given several judgments that are relevant 
to determine the rights to accommodation of people with disabilities. even when, in 
these cases, applicants were not admitted, the court recognises explicitly the obli­
gation of the states to take effective measures for disabled citizens, holding that by 
refraining to do so, the states may violate the rights of the ecHr. the fact that the 
applicants in these cases were not admitted, was due to the fact that the particular 
circumstances of the cases concerned were not sufficiently directly linked to the sub­
stantial relevant rights of the convention (the right to privacy and family life).20
in 2004, the european committee of Social rights, referring to the abovemen­
tioned Thlimmenos judgment of the ecHr, held, that the right to education as em­
bodied in Articles 5 and 7 of the european Social charter, obliged the state to take 
adequate steps to ensure this right to all. in this case France had failed to meet this 
obligation because it did not achieve sufficient progress in advancing the provision of 
education for persons with autism, and a chronic shortage continued to exist.2 this 
case underlines that financial implications are not seen as a justification not to take 
positive measures. this is in accordance with the exception, included in Article 5 of 
the Framework Directive, which allows only exceptions on the obligation to provide 
a reasonable accommodation in case of a disproportionate burden. 
the regular tests as applied by these human rights institutions to achieve a fair bal­
ance between the different interests at stake will be relevant to considering whether in 
a particular case the accommodation required is ‘reasonable’. this will depend on the 
circumstances of the case, such as the size of the company, the length of the contract, 
the costs involved, the availability of grants or allowances (see also the last sentence 
of Article 5 Framework Directive).
4. Reasonable accommodation
4. european court of Justice
the first case on disability discrimination considered by the european court thus far 
does not provide much more insight into the interpretation of the concept of reason­
able discrimination. the most important question in the case of Sonia Chacón Na-
20)
  ecHr, 24 February 998, Botta vs. Italy and ecHr, 4 May 2002, Zehnalova and Zehnal v. The Czech 
Republic.
2)
  eSc, 4 March 2004, Autism-Europe vs. France, case 3 /2002.
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vas vs. Eurest Colectividades22 focused on the concept of disability, in particular the 
relation between disability and sickness. the european court ruled that a dismissal 
solely because of sickness is not protected as being disability discrimination by the 
Framework Directive. But the court added that ‘the prohibition, as regards dismissal, 
of discrimination on grounds of disability contained in Articles 2() and 3()(c) of 
Directive 2000 /78 precludes dismissal on grounds of disability which, in the light of 
the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities, is 
not justified by the fact that the person concerned is not competent, capable and avail­
able to perform the essential functions of his post’.
This reemphasises that only the absolute incompetence of the employee can 
justify dismissal of a person with disability.
in a pending case the european court will have to determine whether the prohibi­
tion of discrimination persons with disabilities also covers persons ‘associated with 
disabled persons’.23
4.2 the Netherlands’ equal treatment commission and other national cases
the Dutch equal treatment commission24 has given more than 80 opinions on dis­
ability discrimination. the opinions show a wide variety of possible reasonable ac­
commodations.
the commission established discrimination when a computer screen was refused 
to a employee with bad sight, and this finally caused dismissal. in another case a sign 
language interpreter was seen as a reasonable accommodation for a deaf applicant for 
a job. the University that billed a disabled student for the rent of the room to give him 
the extended exam he needed was acting in a discriminatory way by not providing 
a reasonable accommodation. 
Not all accommodations required are accepted as reasonable by the commission: 
the student who demanded the assistance of personnel of an educational institute to 
suction mucus out of the mouth and /or trachea, was told that this demand went be­
yond what was considered to be a reasonable accommodation (Opinion 2006­59). 
Most relevant are the cases where the equal treatment commission gives the em­
ployer suggestions as to how to provide a reasonable accommodation to defendants 
that refused to employ a disabled person. in several cases the commission advised 
a test to see how relevant the disability was in practice and whether accommodations 
were possible or not: in one case this suggestion was that the employer may reduce 
the risk by offering the possibility of a probationary period (Opinion 2006­77 on 
a manic depressive travel guide). 
Before refusing a disabled applicant, the employer is obliged to obtain adequate 
medical information and he cannot not simply follow ‘assumptions’ which may be 
very stereotyped (Opinion 2006­3).
Not all complaints on disability discrimination are awarded, or lead to the imposi­
tion of duties to accommodate, e.g. a dyslexic student who received negative advice 
on the continuation of management studies alleged that the low results were caused 
22)
  case c­3 /05 Chacón Navas, judgment of  July 2006, not yet reported.
23)
  Pending case c­303 /06 Coleman.
24)




by denial of accommodations, but the commission was convinced that even if not all 
adjustments had been awarded, the general results were so bad that the dismissal was 
sufficiently well founded.
We can also give some examples of reasonable accommodations from the UK, 
which are described by Pauline Hughes25. in the first case Mrs A was dismissed in­
stead of offered a slightly higher­grade job after she became unable to walk due to 
a surgical procedure. the House of lords ruled that such an offer would not have 
been more favourable treatment but reasonable adjustment. in the second case Mrs 
M. did not get requested reasonable adjustments after eye strain, as a consequence of 
which she went on sick leave and finally resigned. Here too the court of Appeal ruled 
that there was a failure to take appropriate steps.
5. To be continued …
the foregoing gives a bird’s eye view of the development of the concepts of disabil­
ity discrimination and reasonable accommodation, with particular reference to the 
Framework Directive. it may be clear that in terms of the Disability rights conven­
tion, these evolving and dynamic concepts introduced in community law by the 
Framework Directive still have to be fully developed in the case law of the european 
court and the national courts. However, international human rights law gives us some 
assistance in the interpretation and the needs to be taken into account. Moreover, it is 
most opportune to compare national cases, both from the so­called ‘specialised bod­
ies’ and from the national courts. A fundamental and comparative approach can help 
us to bring about substantive equality.
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